R.W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. xiii, 529 by Antaki, Mark
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Compte rendu
 
Ouvrage recensé :
 
R.W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. xiii, 529
 
par Mark Antaki
McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill, vol. 55, n° 2, 2010, p. 371-374.
 
 
 
Pour citer ce compte rendu, utiliser l'adresse suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/045093ar
DOI: 10.7202/045093ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 10:52
370   (2010) 55  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
what degree, with the passage of time, will the contributing essayists be 
obliged by the editor to partially modify their views? And will any essays 
in the first edition have become completely redundant?  
 Again, to the readers of Legal Issues and, in this case, to the essayists 
as well, bon voyage et bonne lecture. 
William Tetley C.M., Q.C. 
 
 
————BOOK NOTE———— 
R.W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the 
Rule of Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. xiii, 529. 
 First published in hardback in 2005, reprinted in 2006, and first pub-
lished in paperback in 2008, R.W. Kostal’s A Jurisprudence of Power: Vic-
torian Empire and the Rule of Law18 is usefully contrasted with other re-
cent works on the rule of law such as Brian Z. Tamanaha’s On the Rule of 
Law: History, Politics, Theory.19 As opposed to covering thousands of years 
as well as the politics and theory of the rule of law in 180 pages, Kostal, a 
historian and professor of law at the University of Western Ontario, and 
author of Law and English Railway Capitalism, 1825–1875,20 spends 529 
pages (comprising an introduction, seven chapters, an epilogue, a conclu-
sion, and an appendix) focusing on one historical episode spanning less 
than a decade.  
 A Jurisprudence of Power provides an extensive treatment grounded 
in primary sources, including journalistic ones, of “the prolonged conflict 
that arose in England over the suppression of the Morant Bay uprising in 
Jamaica” in October 1865, when “a crowd of black men and women at-
tacked and burned” a courthouse.21 Its suppression involved the proclama-
tion of martial law by then Governor of Jamaica, Edward John Eyre, and 
the “killing and torturing [of] hundreds of black Jamaicans—that is to 
say, British subjects.”22 The prolonged conflict that arose in England cen-
                                                  
18   R.W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) [A Jurisprudence of Power]. 
19   Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004). 
20   R.W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 1825-1875 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994). 
21  A Jurisprudence of Power, supra note 1 at 1. 
22   Ibid. 
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tred on the propriety and legality of the killing and torture. It was tied, in 
some measure, to conflicting understandings of martial law and of a colo-
nial indemnity act,23 but also to a broader concern that “[a] sprawling em-
pire of non-white, non-Christian peoples could not be safely governed 
within a scrupulous constitutional framework.”24 The conflict in England 
was also closely tied to the activities of the Jamaica Committee, a “grand 
coalition of Christian activists and secular liberals”25 whose “raison d’être 
... was to defend a liberal jurisprudence of power.”26 Their efforts to crimi-
nally prosecute Eyre and others brought to the fore the “contradictions 
thrown up by law and imperialism,”27 and raised the question of whether 
there could be “such [a] thing as a liberal empire.”28 Kostal’s pairing of law 
and liberalism, not at all unusual,29 invites a reading of his work along-
side that of Uday Singh Mehta’s Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nine-
teenth-Century British Liberal Thought.30 Mehta’s book notably includes a 
treatment of John Stuart Mill, who became a central actor in the Jamaica 
Committee and therefore in Kostal’s story. 
 Kostal devotes his efforts to attending to, mapping out, and thematiz-
ing the English preoccupation with legality as manifested in, but also as 
constitutive of, the Jamaica controversy. Throughout his book, Kostal 
aims “to show how legal ways of seeing and doing were central features of 
English political discourse and conflict.”31 He aims in part to provide a 
corrective to previous historical accounts of the Jamaica controversy 
which “failed to apprehend that the Jamaica affair was understood, de-
scribed, and contested largely in terms of legal language and proce-
dures.”32 Kostal’s book narrates and reconstructs one historical episode 
closely tied to what Judith N. Shklar has famously called legalism, “the 
ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, 
and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by 
                                                  
23   Ibid. at 11. 
24   Ibid. at 68. 
25   Ibid. at 15. 
26   Ibid. at 473. 
27   Ibid. at 485-86. 
28   Ibid. at 486. 
29   With respect to Canadian legal history, see e.g. Robert C. Vipond, Liberty and Commu-
nity: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York, 1991), (see especially c. 5, “Provincial Autonomy and the Rule of Law” 
at 113). See also the work of Richard Risk. 
30   Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British 
Liberal Thought (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999).  
31   A Jurisprudence of Power, supra note 1 at 464. 
32   Ibid. at 2. 
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rules”33 and of which “[t]he court of law and the trial according to law are 
the social paradigms, the perfection, the very epitome.”34 
 Kostal’s twenty-two page introduction sets forth the Morant Bay up-
rising, its suppression, and the formation of the Jamaica Committee. He 
ties the uprising at the courthouse to a racist local justice and situates it 
against British Jamaica’s history and constitution, particularly its history 
of slavery and slave insurrection. He also draws attention to the suppres-
sion’s most famous victim, a “coloured landowner-politician, George 
Gordon,”35 who had been a prominent advocate of reforms but of whom it 
had not been alleged that he “had been directly involved in acts of vio-
lence.”36 Even though he surrendered voluntarily when charged with high 
treason and sedition, he was removed “from the civilian jurisdiction of 
Kingston for trial by a military tribunal at Morant Bay.”37 He was 
“[d]enied access to a lawyer, and most other vestiges of civilian criminal 
justice,”38 and was ultimately sentenced to execution and hanged.  
 Kostal finds “unremarkable” that “[t]he insecurity of whites had al-
ways been the central premiss of public law and planning in the colony” 
but finds “[m]ore intriguing” that “Jamaica’s colonial officials ... in the face 
of dire public emergency, were also preoccupied with legality.”39 This pre-
occupation, Kostal explains, also characterized Eyre’s response to the re-
bellion and his turn to legal advice and to martial law. Nevertheless, 
“[t]he definition of martial law was one vexed question, the nature of the 
legal authority to proclaim martial law another.”40 The preoccupation with 
legality coupled with martial law’s unsettled character are inseparable 
and dominant themes in Kostal’s account and reflect the title of his work.  
  Kostal begins the principal part of his narrative by tracing the trans-
formation of the Jamaica affair into a historical episode of legalism and 
ends by pointing to some of the limits of this legalism. The first chapter, 
“‘The Country of Law’: Reconstructing the Morant Bay Uprising in Eng-
land”, shows how “[i]n the space of just more than two weeks,” beginning 
in the first week of November 1865, “the Jamaica affair had been trans-
formed from a narrative about the salvation of Jamaican colonists into a 
                                                  
33   Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1964) at 1. 
34   Ibid. at 2. 
35   A Jurisprudence of Power, supra note 1 at 13. 
36   Ibid. at 14. 
37   Ibid. 
38   Ibid. 
39   Ibid. at 7. 
40   Ibid. at 10. 
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narrative about the destruction of the English constitution.”41 The last 
chapter, “‘The Most Law-Loving People in the World’: The Denouement of 
the Jamaican Litigation”, ends with the following two sentences: “The 
courtroom, it was commonly thought, was a ‘sphere that ought to be free 
from all disturbance.’ The Jamaica affair had done much to dispel this 
myth.”42  
 The seven chapters as a whole narrate the Jamaica affair, focusing in 
particular on the Jamaica Committee’s attempts to criminally prosecute 
Eyre, who became “the living embodiment of the argument for (and 
against) martial law,”43 for the murder of Gordon. “The paradox of the 
Jamaica affair,” Kostal shows using the Gordon case as an example, “is 
that it so quickly stopped being about Jamaica and Jamaicans.”44 In part 
because of the leadership of John Stuart Mill and in part because of sur-
rounding circumstances, by the end of 1866, the Jamaica affair had 
turned into “a dispute about the civil liberties of Englishmen at home.”45 
It “was no longer about the violence done to a hapless black peasantry. It 
was now mainly about the violence done to the laws of England.”46 Kostal 
charts the Committee’s attempts to attain “[i]ts single and unwavering 
goal,” “to provide an occasion for a high court judge—an unelected offi-
cial—to vindicate what was viewed as the country’s ‘true’ constitution.”47 
Kostal writes, “More specifically, the Committee wanted to provide an op-
portunity (in the form of a criminal case) for a high court judge to pro-
nounce that the summary arrest, court martial, and execution of civilians 
was illegal even when done under the banner of martial law.”48 Ulti-
mately, while “the Jamaica Committee failed to achieve a decisive legal 
precedent about the law of martial law,” it “succeeded in causing the Eng-
lish governing class to confront the contradiction between the love of 
power and the love of law.”49 The Epilogue turns to civil litigation against 
Eyre after the Jamaica Committee abandoned the strategy of (private) 
criminal prosecution. 
                                                  
41   Ibid. at 37. 
42   Ibid. at 431. 
43   Ibid. at 271. 
44   Ibid. at 190. 
45   Ibid. 
46   Ibid. Compare with Valverde’s reading of R. v. Butler ([1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 89 D.L.R. 
(4th) 449) in which she highlights the Supreme Court of Canada’s transformation of the 
Canadian Charter itself into “a new potential victim of pornography”: Marianna Val-
verde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2003) at 38. 
47   A Jurisprudence of Power, supra note 1 at 372. 
48   Ibid. 
49   Ibid. at 19. 
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 In his conclusion, Kostal remarks: 
If the legal system had failed to deliver a decisive answer to the con-
tradictions thrown up by law and imperialism, it was because they 
could not be answered decisively, not, at least by citing legal authori-
ties. The constitutional law of England was not so much a fixed body 
of precedents as a deep reservoir of public conscience, one roiled by 
powerful cross-currents. 
 If it seems obvious that all constitutions, even those that have 
been arranged systematically, are dynamic and contestable, this 
point was not obvious to the main protagonists of the Jamaica affair. 
Even Mill, the enormously erudite leader of the Jamaica Committee, 
advanced a strangely naive view of constitutional law and interpre-
tation. Throughout the duration of the Jamaica controversy Mill 
spoke of “great legal and constitutional principles” as if they were 
rules of arithmetic.50 
 The tendency to see legal and constitutional principles as rules of 
arithmetic is symptomatic of a legalism that forecloses the possibility of 
“an approach suitable to law as an historical phenomenon.”51 Kostal’s 
book is an extended invitation to not take for granted the turns to rules, 
lawyers, and courts. Kostal invites us to see these turns as political ones 
tied to historically situated ways of thinking and doing. As the McGill 
Law Journal’s special issue on the fiftieth anniversary of Roncarelli v. 
Duplessis should remind us,52 one of the dangers of abstractly celebrating 
the rule of law and its various moments of triumph is the neglect of our 
history. 
Mark Antaki 
    
                                                  
50   Ibid. at 485-86. 
51   Shklar, supra note 16 at 3. 
52   This special issue is forthcoming in (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 
